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ABSTRACT
Malicious actors create inauthentic social media accounts controlled
in part by algorithms, known as social bots, to disseminate misin-
formation and agitate online discussion. While researchers have
developed sophisticated methods to detect abuse, novel bots with
diverse behaviors evade detection. We show that different types of
bots are characterized by different behavioral features. As a result,
commonly used supervised learning techniques suffer severe per-
formance deterioration when attempting to detect behaviors not
observed in the training data. Moreover, tuning these models to
recognize novel bots requires retraining with a significant amount
of new annotations, which are expensive to obtain. To address these
issues, we propose a new supervised learning method that trains
classifiers specialized for each class of bots and combines their de-
cisions through the maximum rule. The ensemble of specialized
classifiers (ESC) can better generalize, leading to an average im-
provement of 56% in F1 score for unseen accounts across datasets.
Furthermore, novel bot behaviors are learned with fewer labeled
examples during retraining. We are deploying ESC in the newest
version of Botometer, a popular tool to detect social bots in the
wild.
KEYWORDS
social media, bot detection, supervised learning
1 INTRODUCTION
Social media accounts partially controlled by algorithms, known as
social bots, have been extensively studied [21, 41]. The automated
nature of bots makes it easy to achieve scalability when spreading
misinformation [36, 37], amplifying popularity [9, 34, 45], or po-
larizing online discussion [39]. Bot activity has been reported in
different domains, including politics [5, 20, 39], health [2, 3, 6, 17],
and business [12, 13]. Due to the wide adoption of social media,
every aspect of people’s life from news consumption to presidential
elections is vulnerable to potential manipulation by bots.
The public is beginning to recognize the existence and role of
social bots: according to a recent Pew survey [40], two thirds of
Americans have knowledge of bots and over 80% believe bots have
a negative impact. Actions have been taken to restrict the potential
damage caused by deceptive bots, as those that poses as humans. For
example, California passed a “Bot Disclosure” law in July 2019, re-
quiring bots to reveal themselves in certain cases (leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1001). How-
ever, there is no guarantee that such legislative solutions will be
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effective against malicious bots, or even that they will survive con-
stitutional challenges. In an arms race between abusive behaviors
and countermeasures, novel social bots emerge everyday and evade
purge from the platforms [15, 21]. Therefore, the availability of
tools to identify social bots is still important for protecting the
authenticity and health of the information ecosystem.
Many social bot detection methods based on machine learn-
ing have been proposed in the past several years (see Related
Work). Here we focus on supervised learning methods, particu-
larly Botometer [43, 48], a widely adopted tool designed to evaluate
Twitter accounts. Supervised methods are only as good as their
training data. Bots with unseen characteristics are easily missed, as
demonstrated by a drastic drop in recall when classifiers are faced
with cross-domain accounts [18]. One common approach to address
the lack of general model is to retrain models with new labeled
datasets [48]. Unfortunately, high-quality datasets of annotated
social media accounts are expensive to acquire.
In this paper, we aim to improve the cross domain performance
of Botometer in the wild and better tune the method to the adversar-
ial bot detection problem. Using classes of bot and human accounts
in different datasets as distinct domains, we show that bot accounts
exhibit greater heterogeneity in their discriminative behavioral
features across domains, compared to human accounts. Motivated
by this observation, we propose a novel method to construct a bot
detection system capable of better generalization by training mul-
tiple classifiers specialized for different types of bots. Once these
domain-specific classifiers are trained, unseen accounts are eval-
uated by combining their assessments. We evaluate cross-domain
performance by testing on datasets that are not used for training,
as opposed to in-domain evaluation through cross-validation. With-
out loss of in-domain accuracy, the proposed approach effectively
increases the recall of cross-domain bots. It can also learn more
efficiently from examples in new domains.
Given these results, the proposedmethod is being deployed in the
newest version of Botometer, a widely adopted tool to detect social
bots in the wild that is publicly available from the Observatory on
Social Media at Indiana University.
2 THE CHALLENGE OF GENERALIZATION
2.1 Datasets
We considered various labeled datasets available through the Bot
Repository (botometer.iuni.iu.edu/bot-repository).Most of the datasets
are annotated by humans, while others are created using auto-
mated techniques based on account behavior, filters on metadata,
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Table 1: Annotated datasets.
Dataset Annotation method Ref. Bots Humans
caverlee Honeypot + verified 26 15,483 14,833
varol-icwsm Human annotation 43 733 1,495
cresci-17 Various methods 11 7,049 2,764
pronbots Spam bots 48 17,882 0
celebrity Celebrity accounts 48 0 5,918
vendor-purchased Fake followers 48 1,087 0
botometer-feedback Human annotation 48 139 380
political-bots Human annotation 48 62 0
gilani-17 Human annotation 22 1,090 1,413
cresci-rtbust Human annotation 28 353 340
cresci-stock Sign of coordination 12 7,102 6,174
botwiki+verified Human annotation 49 698 1,987
kaiser-1 Politicians + new bots 35 875 499
kaiser-2 German politicians +
german bots
35 27 433
kaiser-3 German politicians +
new bots
35 875 433
combined-test gilani-17 +
cresci-rtbust +
cresci-stock +
kaiser-1 + kaiser-2
9,432 8,862
or more sophisticated procedures to achieve high precision (see Ta-
ble 1 for details). For example, the vendor-purchased dataset con-
tains fake followers purchased from several companies; accounts in
cresci-stock show highly coordinated behavior that is extremely
unlikely for human accounts; verified consists of randomly sam-
pled verified accounts from the Twitter stream and is added to
balance the datasets with only bots for our analysis. In addition
to those datasets in the Bot Repository, we also collected accounts
provided in a recent study conducted by Kaiser et al. [35]. These
datasets made an assumption that all accounts belong to American
and German politicians are being human accounts. They compli-
ment this dataset with manually annotated German language bots
and accounts listed in botwiki dataset.
For training models, we extract over 1,200 features in six cate-
gories: metadata from the accounts and friends, retweet/mention
networks, temporal features, content information, as well as senti-
ment. These features are shown to be effective in identifying social
bots and are described in detail in the literature [42, 43, 48].
2.2 Cross-domain performance comparison
Supervised bot detection methods achieve high accuracy based on
in-domain cross-validation [4]. To measure how recall deteriorates
in cross-domain evaluation, we perform an experiment using four
datasets selected from Table 1: we train a model on one dataset
and test it on another. We use Random Forest classifiers with 100
decision trees. The fraction of trees outputting a positive label is
calibrated using Platt’s scaling [31] and binarized with a threshold
of 0.5. We use 5-fold cross-validation for in-domain classification;
for consistency we split training and test samples in cross-domain
cases as well, reporting average precision and recall.
The results of our experiment are shown in Fig. 1. Diagonal
cells represent in-domain performance, off-diagonal cells report
cross-domain performance. Both precision and recall tend to be
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Figure 1: Precision (left) and recall (right) of RandomForests
trained on one dataset (row) and tested on another (column).
higher for in-domain than cross-domain cases. This demonstrates
limited generalization of supervised models across domains. The
one exception is the high precision when testing on the cresci-17
domain, irrespective of the training datasets. This is due to the fact
that cresci-17 includes spambots, which are represented in all
datasets. By comparing the two panels, we see that recall of bots is
more impaired in cross-domain tests, which aligns with previous
findings [11, 18]. The method proposed in this paper improves
cross-domain bot recall.
To interpret the cross-domain classification results, we plot the
distributions of bot scores in Fig. 2. A bot score is the output of
a Random Forest classifier and corresponds to the proportion of
decision trees in the ensemble that categorize the account as a bot.
In the diagonal plots (in-domain tests), the density plots are left-
skewed for humans and right-skewed for bots, representing a good
separation and yielding high precision, recall, and F1. For most of
the cross-domain experiments, the score distributions are still left-
skewed for humans, but not right-skewed for bots. This suggests
that bot accounts tend to have lower scores in cross-domain cases,
resulting in lower recall. Human accounts, on the other hand, ex-
hibit consistent characteristics across datasets. We will rely on this
observation to improve the generalization power of the proposed
method.
2.3 Predictability of different bot classes
There are different kinds of bots. To illustrate, consider the three
different bot classes in the cresci-17 dataset: traditional spambots,
social spambots, and fake followers.We trained decision treemodels
to discriminate each of these classes of bots from the others. Table 2
lists the most informative features of each class revealed by the
models. We observe different characteristics: traditional spambots
generate a lot of content promoting products and can be detected
by the frequent use of adjectives; social spambots tend to attack or
support political candidates, therefore sentiment is an informative
signal; finally, fake followers tend to have aggressive following
patterns, flagged by the friend/follower ratio.
Given such heterogeneity of bot behaviors, we conjecture that
the drop in cross-domain recall can be attributed to the different
discriminating features of accounts in different datasets. Let us
explore this conjecture using caverlee and varol-icwsm as two
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Figure 2: Bot score distributions for human (blue) and bot (red) accounts in each experiment. Models used in these experiments
are trained on the datasets labeled along the rows and tested on the datasets listed in the columns.
Table 2: Most informative features per bot class in cresci-17.
Rank Traditional spambots Social spambots Fake followers
1 Std. deviation of adjective frequency Tweet sentiment arousal entropy Max. friend-follower ratio
2 Mean follower count Mean friend count Std. deviation of tweet inter-event time
3 Tweet content word entropy Mean adjective frequency Mean follower count
4 Max. friend-follower ratio Minimum favorite count User tweet-retweet ratio
5 Max. number of retweet count Tweet content word entropy Mean tweet sentiment happiness
Figure 3: Separation of bots and humans based on two fea-
tures in different datasets. Both plots show the logistic-
regression decision boundary obtained from caverlee.
exemplar datasets. We train a Random Forest in the binary clas-
sification mode on caverlee and use the Gini impurity score of
the decision trees to find the two most informative features. Fig. 3
visualizes bot and human accounts in caverlee and varol-icwsm
on the plane defined by those two features. For the in-domain case
(left scatter plot in the figure), the linear classifier is sufficient to
separate human and bot accounts. But in the cross-domain case
(right plot), the same linear model fails, explaining the drop in recall:
different features and distinct decision rules are needed to detect
different classes of bots.
3 METHODS
3.1 Baseline bot detection models
Before presenting the proposed method, let us select two baselines
for evaluation. The first baseline is the current version of Botometer,
often considered the state-of-the-art method for bot detection [48].
Bot score
…
Voting
RFn
…
Bot score
RF1RF0
Bots Humans Humans1Bot class1 Bot classn Humansn
…
Figure 4: Illustration of the proposed model. The bot score
from RF0 corresponds to the previous version of Botometer,
that from the voting module to the new (ESC) version.
Themodel is a Random Forest, a classificationmodel that has proven
to be effective in high-dimensional problems with complex decision
boundaries. In this approach, we output the fraction of positive
votes as a bot score. Bots from all datasets are merged into a single
bot (positive) class.We refer to this baseline as Botometer-v3.We also
consider a variation of the Botometer baseline that does not consider
a set of features describing time zone and language metadata, as
those are no longer available through the Twitter API. We refer to
this variation as Botometer-v3.1. The two Botometer baselines use
1,209 and 1,160 features, respectively.
We use tweetbotornot2 as a second baseline. This model is based
on a supervised classifier that considers over a hundred features in
three main categories: user-level attributes, tweeting statistics, and
text-based patterns. The motivation behind this choice of baseline
is that tweetbotornot2 has been developed independently, is widely
used, and is easily accessible by the general public via an R library
(tweetbotornot2.mikewk.com).
3.2 Proposed method
The proposed approach is inspired by the two empirical findings
discussed in the previous section. First, inspired by the observa-
tion that human accounts are more homogeneous than bots across
domains, we train a model on all human and bot examples across
datasets and use it to identify likely humans. Second, since different
bot classes have different sets of informative features, we propose
to build specialized models for distinct bot classes. The specialized
human and bot models are aggregated into an ensemble and their
outputs are combined through a voting scheme. We call this ap-
proach Ensemble of Specialized Classifiers (ESC) and we also refer it
as the Botometer-v4.
Fig. 4 illustrates the ESC architecture. The human detection
subsystem actually corresponds to Botometer (the baseline classi-
fier), and constitutes the left-most component RF0 of the ensemble
shown in the figure. We then build specialized bot classifiers using
Random Forest models (RF1 . . .RFn in Fig. 4). All Random Forest
classifiers in this paper are implemented using the scikit-learn pack-
age [33]. We use 100 decision tree estimators; all other parameters
take the default values. Each specialized classifier RFi is trained on
a balanced set of accounts from bot class BCi and an equal number
|BCi | of human examples sampled from human accounts across all
datasets.
Figure 5: Correlation between bot scores obtained from the
two methods.
A bot score is calculated by a voting scheme for the classifiers in
the ensemble. Among the specialized bot classifiers, the one that
outputs the highest bot score si is most likely to have recognized
a bot of the corresponding class. Therefore we use the maximum
rule to aggregate the bot scores. For the human classifier RF0, a low
bot score s0 is a strong signal of a human account. Therefore we
determine the winning class as i∗ = argmaxi {s ′i } where
s ′i =
{
1 − si if i = 0
si else.
The bot score returned by ESC is obtained by calibrating the score
si∗ using Platt’s scaling [31]. As we see in the Results section, the
maximum rule has the effect of shifting scores of likely bots toward
one and the scores of likely humans toward zero. Along with the bot
score, ESC can also produce the bot class label i∗ as an explanatory
outcome.
4 RESULTS
4.1 In-domain performance
Before discussing cross-domain performance, let us demonstrate
that ESC is capable of detecting bots with good accuracy in the
classic (in-domain) scenario. Using 5-fold cross-validation, ESC
achieves an Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) of 0.96, similar
to the Botometer classifier (0.97 AUC). The scatter plot in Fig. 5
shows a good agreement between the bot scores obtained with ESC
(Botometer-v4) and the Botometer-v3 baseline (Spearman’s ρ = 0.87).
Let us pay special attention to accounts having low Botometer
and high ESC scores, in other words those that are likely human
according to Botometer, but likely bots according to ESC (region
highlighted in Fig 5). These are the only cases where we observe
a clear disagreement between the two methods on ground-truth
labels. We focus on 332 accounts in this region that are labeled as
human (75% are from caverlee), which represent approximately
1% of the examples labeled as human in the training data. One pos-
sible interpretation of the disagreement is that these accounts are
incorrectly classified by ESC (false positives). Another possibility
is that some of these accounts may have changed since they were
manually labeled. Indeed, training datasets are subject to change
over time as accounts become inactive, suspended, or get compro-
mised by third-party applications. Such changes could lead to errors
on ground-truth labels.
Manual inspection of a random sample of 50 of the accounts
highlighted in Fig 5 reveals that the human labels are no longer
accurate for most of them — they have been inactive for years,
are currently devoted to spam diffusion, and/or are controlled by
third-party applications. This suggests that ESC can identify impu-
rities in the training data. While mislabeled accounts impair the
performance of machine learning models, we conjecture that the
ESC model is still able to recognize them because it is more robust
to errors — the incorrect labels only affect a subset of the classifiers.
4.2 Cross-domain performance
We want to demonstrate that the proposed ESC approach gener-
alizes better to cross-domain accounts compared to the current
version of Botometer.
To train the specialized classifiers, we need coherent bot behav-
iors. To this end, we organized the bot accounts in the training
data into separate classes of bots: simple bots, spammer bots,
fake-followers, honest bots, political bots, and other bots.
Bot accounts in the caverlee dataset are assigned to simple bots.
For spammer botswe use bot accounts in pron-bots and cresci-17.
Fake-followers include subset of bot accounts in cresci-17 and
vendor-purchased. The honest and political bot categories are de-
rived from the botwiki and political-bots dataset, respectively.
The rest of the bots captured in other datasets are aggregated into
the other bots category.
In this set of experiments, some datasets are held out in the train-
ing phase and are then used as cross-domain test cases: cresci-stock,
gilani-17, cresci-rtbust, kaiser-1, kaiser-2, and kaiser-3.
In addition, combined-test combines these datasets while avoid-
ing duplication. We focus on F1 and AUC as the accuracy metrics,
using 5-fold cross-validation to provide confidence intervals.
We compare the ESC approach (Botometer-v4) with the Botometer-
v3 baseline model [48], as well as the Botometer-v3.1 baseline to
exclude the possibility that improvements are due to the removal of
features based on deprecated metadata. The language agnostics ver-
sion of Botometer (excluding English-based linguistic features) is
used on the kaiser-2 dataset because of its German tweet content.
To illustrate the main enhancement afforded by ESC, let us com-
pare the distributions of bot scores generated by Botometer-v3 and
Botometer-v4 in cross-domain experiments. Due to space limita-
tions, we illustrate in Fig. 6 just one case where cresci-rtbust
is used as test set; other cases are similar. Both methods tend to
yield low scores for human accounts, as the same classifier (RF0)
is used. On the other hand, Botometer-v4 produces significantly
higher scores than Botometer-v3 on bot accounts. This is a result
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Figure 6: Distributions of bot scores (using KDE) for both
methods on the cresci-rtbust dataset.
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Figure 7: F1 (left) and AUC (right) of Botometer-v4 (ESC) and
baseline methods on hold-out test datasets. Error bars indi-
cate 95% confidence intervals.
of the maximum rule and leads to higher cross-domain recall, or
better generalization.
Fig. 7 shows that Botometer-v4 (ESC) outperforms the Botometer
baseline in most cases. On average across the six datasets, recall
goes from 42% to 84% (an improvement of 100%) while precision
increases from 52% to 64%. As a result, F1 increases from 47% to 73%
(an improvement of 56%). On the combined-test dataset, recall
goes from 77% to 86%, precision stays at 70%, and F1 goes from 73%
to 77% (an improvement of 5%). Comparisons based on AUC scores
are similar.
The kaiser-1 and kaiser-3 datasets include bots from botwiki,
which are part of the Botometer-v4 training data. Therefore these
two cannot be considered completely hold-out datasets, but are
included nonetheless because they were used to highlight weak-
nesses of Botometer-v3 in a recent independent report [35], so they
provide us with an opportunity to demonstrate the performance of
the latest Botometer model. Even if we exclude botwiki from the
training data, ESC still outperforms Botometer-v3. For example, it
yields an F1 score of 0.84 on kaiser-1 and 0.80 on kaiser-3.
Botometer-v4 yields F1 better than or comparable with tweet-
botornot2 on all datasets except those from Rauchfleisch and Kaiser
[35]. The AUC metric is comparable on those datasets, while tweet-
botornot2 wins on gilani-17 and Botometer-v4 wins on the other
datasets. On the combined-test dataset, Botometer-v4 outperforms
tweetbotornot2 on both F1 and AUC.
In interpreting these results, note that kaiser-3 contains human
accounts from kaiser-2 and bot accounts from kaiser-1, so they
are not independent. kaiser-2 includes only 27 bot accounts; the
F1 score is sensitive to this class imbalance. Furthermore, while we
do not know how the tweetbotornot2 baseline was trained, it uses a
feature for “verified” profiles and tends to assign a low bot score to
them, even automated ones such as @twittersupport. 98% and 72%
of accounts labeled human in kaiser-1 and kaiser-3 respectively
are verified. This biases the results in favor of tweetbotornot2.
4.3 Model adaptation
Real-world applications of social bot detection always face the
challenge of recognizing novel behaviors that are not represented
in the training data. Periodic retraining to include newly annotated
datasets helps systems adapt to these unseen examples. A common
approach is to train a new classifier from scratch including both old
and new training data, which may not be efficient. The proposed
ESC method alleviates this problem because we can add a new
classifier RFn+1 to the ensemble to be trained with the new data,
without retraining the existing classifiers.
Let analyze how quickly the Botometer-v3 and ESC models adapt
to a new domain. To quantify this, we split the data from a hold-out
domain into two random subsets for training and testing. Results are
presented using varol-icwsm as the hold-out domain for both mod-
els. (We reach similar conclusions using other hold-out datasets.)
800 examples from the hold-out dataset are used for training. In
each iteration we randomly sample 50 examples and add them to
the training set. In the Botometer-v3 case, we retrain the entire clas-
sifier (RF0), whereas in the ESC case we only train a newly added
specialized classifier (RFn+1).
Fig. 8 shows how the F1 score on the test data improves as a func-
tion of the number of training examples from the hold-out domain.
The Botometer-v3 baseline adapts more slowly. We can interpret
this result by recalling that the size of the hold-out dataset is small
compared to the training size (over 67,000 examples in Botometer-
v3). The decision trees use Gini gain as a feature selection criterion,
therefore the number of examples sharing the same informative fea-
tures affects the selection of those features. As a result, the old bot
classes with more examples dominate and the classifier struggles
to learn about the new domain. On the other hand, the ESC archi-
tecture quickly learns about new bots through the new classifier,
which starts from scratch, while what was learned about the old
ones is preserved in the existing classifiers. This means that fewer
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Figure 8: Adaptation of two methods to new examples from
the varol-icwsm dataset, which was held out from the train-
ing data.
labeled examples are needed to train a new specialized classifier
when novel types of bots are observed in the wild.
5 RELATEDWORK
Different approaches have been proposed for automatic social bot
detection. Crowdsourcing is convenient and one of the first pro-
posals to collect annotated data effectively [47], but annotation
has limitations due to scalability and user privacy. Thus automatic
methods are of greater interest, especially for social media services
that deal with millions of accounts. The structure of the social graph
captures valuable connectivity information. Facebook employed
an immune system [38] that relied on the assumption that sybil ac-
counts tend to connect mostly to other sybil accounts while having
a small number of links to legitimate accounts.
Supervised machine learning approaches, such as the one pro-
posed in this paper, extract various features from an account’s
profile, social network, and content [16, 23, 29, 41, 43, 48, 49]. These
methods rely on annotated datasets for learning the difference be-
tween bot and human accounts. However, since bots change and
evolve continuously to evade detection, supervised learning algo-
rithms need to adapt to new classes of bots [21, 44, 48].
Some unsupervised learning methods have been proposed in
the literature [11, 27]. They can be less vulnerable to performance
decay across domains. They are especially suitable for finding co-
ordination among bots [1, 29, 32]. Since accounts in a coordinated
botnet may not appear suspicious when considered individually,
supervised methods would miss them [11, 24]. Identifying botnets
requires analysis of the activity of multiple accounts to reveal their
coordination. Depending on the type of bots, similarity can be
detected through tweet content [8, 25], temporal features in the
timelines [7, 10], or retweeting behavior [28, 46].
A recent research direction is to address the limits of current bot
detection frameworks in an adversarial setting. Cresci et al. [14]
predict that future techniques will be able to anticipate the ever-
evolving spambots rather than taking countermeasures only after
seeing them. The performance decay of current detection systems in
the wild was reported by Cresci et al. [11], who showed that Twitter,
human annotators, and state-of-the-art bot detection systems failed
at discriminating between some new social spambots and genuine
accounts. In agreement with the present findings, Echeverria and
Zhou [19] suggest that detecting different types of bots requires
different types of features. Echeverría et al. [18] proposed the leave-
one-botnet-out methodology, to highlight how detection methods
do not generalize well to unseen bot classes due to bias in the
training data. Even a classifier trained on 1.5 million accounts and
22 classes of bots is incapable of identifying new classes of bots.
Here we follow the idea of leave-one-class-out methodology by
leaving the complete test cases out of the training sets to evaluate
the generalization power of the proposed approach.
Some papers have characterized bot classes [30]. Lee et al. [26]
define traditional spammers, mention spammers, friend infiltrators,
and social spammers in their dataset. Cresci et al. [11] highlight that
it is hard for human annotators to assign one label to one account
to describe its bot class. They also report that some bot classes,
like social spambots, are hard to distinguish from human accounts.
Despite the existence of different types of bots, no systems have
been presented in the literature to automatically identify the type
of a bot as the method proposed here.
Rauchfleisch and Kaiser [35] have criticised Botometer (more
specifically Botometer-v3) for its high false positive and false neg-
ative rates. As we have discussed in this paper, we share these
concerns and acknowledge that like any supervised learning model,
Botometer makes mistakes. Indeed, the new version introduced
in the paper is motivated by this issue and partly addresses it by
improving cross-domain recall (false negatives). At the same time,
Rauchfleisch and Kaiser [35] may overestimate the false positive
rate by assuming that no politician account uses automation. We
believe this assumption is not realistic, considering these accounts
are often managed by media teams and use scheduling tools for
content creation. In fact, Botometer currently does not use the “ver-
ified” status as a feature because it could lead to false negatives [45].
Another source of bias is that Rauchfleisch and Kaiser [35] overlook
accounts that are no longer available due to suspension, possibly
leading to an underestimation of both precision and recall.
6 CONCLUSION
The dynamic nature of social media creates challenges for machine
learning systems making inferences and predictions on online data.
On the one hand, platforms can change features, require models to
be retrained. Further difficulties arise as accounts used for training
change behavior, become inactive, compromised, or are removed
from the platform, invalidating ground-truth data. On the other
hand, account behaviors can change and evolve. As is typical in
adversarial settings, automated accounts become more sophisti-
cated to evade detection. The emergence of more advanced bot
capabilities brings additional challenges for existing systems that
struggle to generalize to novel behaviors.
Despite impressive results when training and test sets are from
the same domain — even using cross-validation — supervised mod-
els will miss new classes of bots, leading to low recall. We demon-
strate in this paper that the performance deterioration observed
for out-of-domain accounts is due to heterogeneous bot behaviors
that require different informative subsets of features. Inspired by
v1 v2 v3
Figure 9: Daily requests of the Botometer API. Annotations
indicate the versions of the models deployed in different
time periods.
this, we presented a novel approach for the automatic identification
of novel social bots through an ensemble of specialized classifiers
trained on different bot classes. We demonstrated empirically that
our proposed approach generalizes better than a monolithic classi-
fier and is more robust to mislabeled training examples.
The proposed architecture is highly modular as each specialized
classifier works independently, so one can substitute any part with
different models as needed. We can also include additional spe-
cialized classifiers when new annotated datasets become available.
We showed that this approach allows the system to learn about
new domains in an efficient way, in the sense that fewer annotated
examples are necessary. In addition, the architecture of our model
offers greater transparency about the decision process by allowing
inspection of the outputs of different ensemble components and by
providing interpretable class labels in output.
In light of these results, we are deploying ESC in the newest
version of Botometer, a tool to detect social bots in the wild that
is available through the Observatory on Social Media at Indiana
University. Botometer can be accessed both through an interactive
website (botometer.org) and programmatically through a public API
(rapidapi.com/OSoMe/api/botometer-pro). The tool is quite popular
among researchers and practitioners; at the time of this writing, it
is mentioned in 1,290 articles according to Google Scholar, and it
fields over half a million queries daily (Fig. 9).
In future work, we would like to investigate methods to rec-
ognize the appearance of a new type of bots that warrants the
addition of a new classifier to the ensemble. We could also design
an unsupervised method to cluster similar accounts across datasets
automatically, and assign homogeneous accounts to each of the
specialized classifiers. Finally, we can design active learning query
strategies to make the retraining process even more efficient than
with random selection. This would be useful when reliable user
feedback is available to be used as an oracle.
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